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Abstract—This paper develops a distributed resource
allocation game to study countries’ pursuit of targets such
as self-survival in the networked international environ-
ment. The contributions are two. First, the game formalizes
countries’ power allocation behaviors which fall into the
broad category of humans resource allocation behaviors.
Second, the game presents a new technical problem, and
establishes pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence.
Index Terms—power, resource allocation, friends, adver-
saries, networks, games
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Question
What fundamentally drives politics in international
relations? This paper takes to position that the answer
is the way in which each country’s “power” is allo-
cated where by the power of a country is meant a
concept adopted from [1]. This concept suggests that na-
tional power aggregates all the conventional and nuclear
war making capabilities mobilizable for use in interna-
tional security, being composed of geography, natural
resources(e.g., food, raw materials), industrial capac-
ity, military preparedness (e.g., technology, leadership,
quantity and quality of armed forces), population (e.g.,
distribution and trends), national character, national
morale and quality of diplomacy and government [1].
The real-world contexts underlying the environment
(e.g., the nature of countries’ engagement) are crucial
to evaluating power. Several important aspects include,
for instance, whether the engagement is real conflict or
peacetime escalation. In peacetime, a country’s military
power may include its manpower, land systems, air
power, naval power, logistical and financial support,
and so forth. In wars, a country’s power includes all
its mobilized resources. Also, even the national morale
would become relevant for assessing countries’ power in
wars — even if two countries have the same amount of
power, the mutiny and morale problems could mark the
difference between victory and defeat after controlling
for the other factors.
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Power allocation is entirely different than other
types of allocation (e.g., spectrum allocation, personnel
allocation, etc) both in terms of its form and its
objectives. We will be interested in a collection
C of n > 0 countries labelled from 1 to n.
Distinct countries i and j are neighbors if there
is a “bilateral relationship” between the two which
might be either a friend relation or an adversarial
relation. For instance, the collection of countries,
{GMY,UKG,RUS,FRN,AUH,ITA,ROM,SER,NOR},
shown in the map of Europe in Figure 1, were involved
in WWI as of July 28, 1914, and labelled from 1 to
9. Specifically speaking, a country allocates its power
to itself and every neighbor. Though its power may
increase over time, this kind of allocations happen all
of the time.
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Fig. 1: Red lines denote adversary relations and green
lines denote friend relations.
Power allocation theoretically generalizes many kinds
of international affairs a country may possibly pursue,
e.g., deploying arms and personnels to attack an adver-
sary or to militarily assist a friend. By doing so, the
country aims to support the survival of themselves and
their friends and oppose that of their adversaries, and,
amongst all, makes its self-survival the first priority, just
as stated in the inaugural address of John F. Kennedy in
1961, “we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure
the survival and the success of liberty”. This is also
consistent with a basic assumption that has been held
in the literature of international relations theory ever
since the publication of [2], that is, countries primarily
seek self-survival as the minimal target, and, when this
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target is satisfied, would pursue “universal domination”
at a maximum target – “Universal domination” can def-
initely be interpreted as a form of “success” mentioned
above, which at least reflects in jeopardizing the adver-
saries’ survival, and also, invariably, in guaranteeing the
friends’ survival.
A natural question arises: could a country always
survive in an arbitrary international environment? To
answer this question, we develop a general framework,
which is a distributed resource allocation game on
networks, for studying all possible directions of coun-
tries’ power allocation in any networked international
environment, i.e., environments that have existed or still
exist or that are hypothetical, and the implications for
the realization of countries’ targets.
B. Contributions
Two features below about our power allocation game
are:
1) The game has an infinite strategy space – as a
country’s power is a nonnegative real number, it
always has infinite possibilities of allocating its
power, which stands in contrast with a finite game
where agents only need to choose from a finite set
of options.
2) The game does not assume a particular group of
countries, particular levels of total power and par-
ticular friend or adversary relations among them.
Instead, many possibilities for the set of countries,
their total power and relation configurations are
accounted for in the game.
The two features help to define a myriad of possibil-
ities for the networked international environment and
then enable a rich set of predictions. To the best of
our knowledge, a resource allocation game like this has
never been studied before. Also, very few papers on
similar problems exist, for which an example is [3] that
focuses on the problem of whether world trade helps to
decrease the frequency of militarized conflicts.
Broadly speaking, the distributed power allocation
game can be used for studying two aspects below:
1) an understanding of countries’ “everyday politics”.
Due to its many forms, a country’s power allo-
cation does not necessarily involve real conflicts
but can be strategies to deter the adversaries and
reassure the friends.
2) an assessment of the favorability of any given
networked international environment for any coun-
try involved. For instance, a question that can be
asked is, are there certain environments that may
enhance a country’s survivability?
II. THE NETWORKED INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
As will be consecutively defined, a “networked in-
ternational environment” consists of a set of countries,
their total power, a set of “admissible strategy ma-
trices”, “support and threat functions” for country i,
“state space”, and a notion of “preferences” which we
formalize with “the axioms of choice”.
A. Countries
As in the introduction, there is a collection C of n
countries, labeled 1, 2, ..., n; let the set of labels be n =
{1, 2, 3, ..., n}.
B. Total Power
Each country i in C has a given nonnegative quantity
pi ∈ R called its total power. By a total power vector
for the countries is meant a real, nonnegative valued row
vector p = [pi]1×n.
C. Friend and Adversary Relations
Apart from itself, each country i has a subset of
countries in C called friends with labels in Fi ⊂ n and
a subset of countries in C called adversaries with labels
in Ai ⊂ n. We assume that for each i ∈ n, {i},Fi,
Ai are disjoint sets. We assume that these relations are
symmetric, that is, if j is a friend (or an adversary) of
i, then i is a friend (or an adversary) of j.
The unordered pair {i, j} stands for a pair of distinct
labels in n such that i and j have a relation. Denote
the set of all friendly pairs as Rf and the set of all
adversarial pairs as Ra. Suppose the number of pairs in
Rf ∪Ra is m. A map η : Rf ∪Ra → m where m =
{1, 2, ...,m} determines for each element in Rf ∪Ra a
distinct label in the set m.
D. Power Allocation Strategy
By country i’s power allocation strategy is meant a
real, nonnegative valued row vector ui ∈ R1×n whose
j-th entry is uij . If j ∈ Fi, then uij represents the
portion of country i’s total power which country i is
willing commit to the support or defense of friend j
against friend j’s adversaries. Similarly, if j ∈ Ai,
then uij is the portion of country i’s total power that
it is committing to its possible offense actions against
country j. In addition, uii is the portion of country i’s
total power it holds in reserve. Finally, if j 6∈ {i}∪Fi∪
Ai, we stipulate that uij = 0.
Accordingly, for each i ∈ n, ∑nj=1 uij = pi so the
i-th row sum of the strategy matrix U = [uij ]n×n is
pi. We write U for the set of all admissible strategy
matrices.
E. Support and Threat
For each country i ∈ n, we define two types of
nonnegative-valued functions on U . The first, called a
support function for country i is the map σi: U →
[0,∞),
U 7−→ uii +
∑
j∈Fi
uji +
∑
j∈Ai
uij
where for j ∈ Fi, uji is the total amount of power
the friends of country i commit to country i’s support
or defense and for j ∈ Ai, uij is the total amount of
power country i commits to its possible offense against
all of its adversaries.
The second function, called a threat function for
country i, is the map τi : U → [0,∞),
U 7−→
∑
j∈Ai
uji
Thus τi(U) is the total power all of country i’s adver-
saries commit to their respective offenses against country
i.
F. State and State Space.
As a consequence of specific allocations, each country
i may find itself in one of three possible states, namely a
safe state, a precarious state, or an unsafe state. Let xi :
U → {safe, precarious, unsafe} denote the state function
xi 7−→

safe if σi(U) > τi(U)
precarious if σi(U) = τi(U)
unsafe if σi(U) < τi(U)
We call xi(U) the state of country i induced by power
allocation strategy U ∈ U . More generally, by the state
of the overall collection of countries C induced by power
allocation matrix U is meant the row vector x(U) =
[xi]1×n. The state space of C is thus the finite set X =
{x(U) : U ∈ U} whose cardinality is 3n.
G. Axioms of Choice
We need to construct a rationale for each country to
choose its own power allocation strategy. This will be
done by comparing states for each country induced by
different strategy matrices. We propose the following
three axioms to capture the most intuitive aspects for any
country’s choice of its own power allocation strategy,
which help to partially order the elements in U .
First, given country j, call V ∈ U an “admissible
alternative” to U ∈ U if xk(U) = xk(V ) for all
k ∈ n r {j}. We note that admissible alternative is
an equivalence relation on U . From the perspective of
country i, U is weakly preferred over V , i.e., U is
strictly preferred over V (U ≺ V ) or they are perceived
indifferently (U ∼ V ), formally U 4 V , if the respective
condition in Axiom 1 holds for that particular country
j, i.e, one of the following holds,
Axiom 1:
• j ∈ {i} ∪ Fi, (xj(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}) ∨
(xj(U) = unsafe)
• j ∈ Ai, (xj(V ) ∈ {unsafe, precarious}) ∨
(xj(U) = safe)
• j 6∈ {i}∪Fi ∪Ai, xj(U) and xj(V ) may take any
value 1
Second, take an arbitrary element V ∈ U without
requiring it to be an admissible alternative to U as
before. From the perspective of country i, U is weakly
preferred over V , formally U 4 V , if the respective
condition in Axiom 2 holds for any country j ∈ n, i.e.,
all of the following holds,
Axiom 2:
• j ∈ {i} ∪ Fi, (xj(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}) ∨
(xj(U) = unsafe)
• j ∈ Ai, (xj(V ) ∈ {unsafe, precarious}) ∨
(xj(U) = safe)
• j 6∈ {i}∪Fi ∪Ai, xj(U) and xj(V ) may take any
value
Third, we would like an axiom to capture countries’
first priority of self-survival, and take an arbitrary V ∈ U
again. From the perspective of country i, U is strictly
preferred over V , formally U ≺ V , if the below holds
for itself,
Axiom 3:
1Here U 4 V trivially holds, and U and V are perceived
indifferently, formally U ∼ V .
• If (xi(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious})∧(xi(U) = unsafe)
In particular, Axiom 3 emphasizes that the best possible
strategy matrix (or matrices) for country i must be one(s)
in which i has achieved self-survival.
H. Graphical Representation
A networked international environment can now be
formally defined as the collection of all the aforemen-
tioned elements or parameters, {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,4}. A
directed and connected2 graph on n vertices and 2m
edges, G = (V, E), is a convenient representation of n
countries, m pairs of which have a relation (n,m ∈ Z),
in an environment:
1) G’s vertex set V = {1, 2, · · · , n} is equivalent to
the set of country labels, n.
2) G’s edge set E = {(i, j) : (i, j) =
η({i, j}), {i, j} ∈ Ra∪Rf}, where η maps every
element {i, j} ∈ Ra ∪ Rf to two ordered pair
(i, j) and (j, i) that represent the two edges with
opposite directions between i and j. Obviously,
|E| = 2m.
The weighted version of the above graph G = (V, E)
can represent a strategy matrix:
1) uij , which represents i’s allocations on the relation
with j 6= i, is drawn as the edge weight of (i, j).
2) uii, which represents i’s power held in reserve, is
drawn as the vertex weight of i.
III. POWER ALLOCATION GAME
A. The Game
The game of interest can be termed as a power allo-
cation game (PAG), which can be defined simply using
the collection of elements denoting the networked in-
ternational environment, Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,4}.The
power allocation game is static, where each country
chooses its own power allocation strategy at the same
time.
A complete information framework is assumed, where
countries have full knowledge of the environment, and
this framework is also suitable for studying the scenar-
ios where countries act upon individual and subjective
perceptions of the environment.
2The connected graph is assumed only for simplicity. For uncon-
nected graphs, we only need to analyze the connected components
separately.
B. Equilibrium Concept
Let country i’s deviation from the strategy matrix U
be a nonnegative-valued 1 × n row vector di ∈ R1×n
such that ui + di is a valid strategy that satisfies the
total power constraint. The deviation set δi(U) is the set
of all possible deviations of country i from the strategy
matrix U . A strategy matrix U is a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any
single country i is profitable for i that is
U + eidi 4 U,∀di ∈ δi(U)
where ei is an n × 1 unit vector whose elements are 0
but the i-th coordinate which is 1.
C. Equilibrium Class
Denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria as
U∗3. Call V ∗ an admissible alternative to U∗ ∈ U∗
if x(U∗) = x(V ∗). Let [U∗]x(U∗) be the equilibrium
equivalence class of U∗ ∈ U∗. Obviously, the total
number of equilibrium equivalence classes is at most
3n, and their union is U∗.
D. Equilibrium Existence: Algorithm
Below we explain how to recursively construct a strat-
egy matrix which is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for
any parametric variation of the power allocation game.
The recursion is only an example of a family of
algorithms that can construct a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for any parametric variation of the game,
and thus proves equilibrium existence for the game – it
never seeks to exhaust the search of all pure strategy
Nash equilibria.
Let q be the number of pairs in RA, and q =
{1, 2, ..., q} be the set of distinct labels for elements
in RA. By an ordering map is meant an bijection γ :
RA → q; any such map determines an ordering of RA
with {i, j} the γ({i, j})-th term in the ordering.
Let zi(k) be the i-th entry in z(k) and ek be the k-th
n× 1 unit vector. Consider the recursion,
z(k) = z(k − 1)−min{zi(k − 1), zj(k − 1)}ek (1)
where k ∈ q, z(k) ∈ R1×n, z(0) = p, and {i, j} =
γ−1(k − 1).
3As will be proved in E, it will be an nonempty set.
Let ei and ej be respectively the i-th and j-th n× 1
unit vector. We let U(k) = U(k − 1)+
min{zi(k − 1), zj(k − 1)}(eieTj + ejeTi ) (2)
where k ∈ q, U(k) ∈ Rn×n, U(0) =
diagonal{z1(q), z2(q), ..., zn(q)}, and {i, j} = γ−1(k −
1).
Despite being a corner solution, U may be the only
kind of equilibria in many cases with non-generic pa-
rameters. U depends on the ordering map γ we have
chosen. Since there are q! such maps, there are at least
q! pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the problem under
consideration.
In the sequel we will prove in Theorem 1 that U =
U(q) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 1: The game Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,4}
always has pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
E. Equilibrium Existence: Proof
The aim of this section is to prove Theorem 1. To
do this it is useful to first establish certain property of
the total power vector in Lemma 1 required for proving
Theorem 1.
Our goal in Lemma 1 is to show that the existence of a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game is equivalent
to a decomposability condition for the total power
vector. The decomposition makes use of an incidence
matrix for the subgraph G′ of all the adversary pairs of
countries.
Incidence Matrix for the Subgraph of All Adversary
Pairs. The q adversary pairs make up a subgraph G′.
The incidence matrix of G′ is B = [bik]n×q , where bi
is its i-th row, and bik = 1 if country i involves in the
k-th (0 ≤ k ≤ q) adversary pair and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 1: The game Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,4} has
a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium if the total power
vector can be decomposed as
pT = Bd+ c (3)
where the following conditions are satisfied:
1) B is the n× q incidence matrix for the subgraph
G′ of the adversary relations.
2) d is an q × 1 nonnegative-valued column vector,
and c is an n × 1 nonnegative-valued column
vector.
3) @{i, j} ∈ Ra, ci > 0 and cj > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose a decomposition of the
total power vector that satisfies the three conditions
exists. We then derive a strategy matrix U as follows:
1) Let allocations between countries in the k-th ad-
versary pair be symmetric and equal to dk, uij =
uji = dk where γ−1(k) = {i, j} ∈ RA and
k ∈ q,
2) Let uii = ci, i ∈ n
3) As a consequence of the above, the allocations
between friends are 0, uij = uji = 0, i ∈ n and
j ∈ Ai.
4) We have stipulated before that uij = uji = 0,
i, j ∈ n and j 6∈ {i} ∪ Ai ∪ Fi
U is a valid strategy matrix because∑n
j=1 uij =
∑
j∈Ai uij + uii = bid+ ci = pi
No country i with adversaries will unilaterally deviate
from ui, because it must fall into either case:
1) ci = 0. Here for any j ∈ Ai, uij = uji, and that
uii = 0. Thus σi(U) = τi(U) = pi, and xi(U) =
precarious. Thus, i cannot deviate to make itself
strictly better off, due to power deficiency.
2) ci > 0. Here it must be that ∀j ∈ Ai, cj = 0.
Then ∀j ∈ Ai, xj(U) = unsafe or precarious.
∀j ∈ {i} ∪ Fi, xj(U) = safe or precarious.
By Axioms 2 and 3, given any arbitrary V ∈ U , i
must weakly prefer U to V , i.e., it has achieved a
best possible power allocation outcome x(U), and
therefore does not need to deviate.
Any country i without adversaries will not unilaterally
deviate from ui, either, because the following holds for
itself:
1) pi = uii.
2) xi(U) = safe.
3) xj(U) = safe or precarious, j ∈ Ai.
By Axioms 2 and 3, i has also achieved a best possible
power allocation outcome x(U), and does not need to
deviate.
Therefore, if the total power vector can be decom-
posed as pT = Bd + c where those requirements hold,
we can derive a strategy matrix that is pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. 
Below we present the proof of Theorem 1, stating
that the algorithm returns a strategy matrix that satisfies
the decomposability condition in Lemma 1 and is thus
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1: By the algorithm, we propose to
decompose the total power vector as follows:
1) let dk = min{zi(k− 1), zj(k− 1)} for γ−1(k) =
{i, j}, k ∈ q
2) let ci = zi(q), i ∈ n.
By the above, the first two conditions about the
decomposition in Lemma 1 are thus proven – d is an
q × 1 nonnegative-valued column vector, and c is an
n× 1 nonnegative-valued column vector.
Now we aim to prove the third condition. By (1) of the
algorithm, at the k-th recursion where γ−1(k) = {i, j} is
traversed, zi(k) and zj(k) cannot be both positive. Also,
zi(k) is non-increasing with k. Thus, zi(q) and zj(q)
cannot be both positive, which means that @{i, j} ∈ Ra,
ci > 0 and cj > 0.
Lastly, the decomposition is valid, i.e., satisfying the
total power constraint:
bid+ zi(q) = pi, i ∈ n (4)
A valid decomposition that satisfies three conditions
in Lemma 1 is thus derived based on the rules of the
algorithm. Therefore, the game always has pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Aside from equilibrium existence, the game has other
theoretical results such as regarding the property of the
equilibrium set and many unintuitive predictions that
we will discuss in a fully fledged paper. Additionally,
the game itself can be theoretically extended to study
another fundamental question, which is how countries
change the environment toward where they can more
easily pursue targets with power allocation, that is,
through changing their own (1) relations (2) or power
(3) or both. Chapter 3 (“Theory of Relation Formation”)
of [4] explores the first possibility theoretically, and we
leave the study of the second and third possibilities for
future extensions.
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